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STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Fairness in contracts entered into during coverture by husband
and wife may be a subject of consideration for two reasons. It may
first arise because the relationship of the contracting parties is a
fiduciary one. It may additionally be involved because the contract
concerns the duty of support. The subject of this note is the former,
i.e., fairness as derived from the confidential relationship of the
a-rties.
Inasmuch as the ability of the husband and wife to contract
with one another is the basis of this note, what is the history and
present status of such a contract?
"At common law a married woman's contracts were void, and
her agreement with her husband was no exception." 1 In fact, the
fictional merger of her legal identity with that of her spouse nulli-
fied any possibility of a direct contract between the two.- It has
been said that there are three means by which the law grows: legis-
lation, fictions and equity In this case, it was not long before the
paternal hand of equity reached out to help avoid manifest in-
justice. The injustice arose when the wife sued to enforce the con-
tract and her action was summarily dismissed. Since the contract
was a nullity, no suit could be maintained thereon. The equities of
the case were with the wife, and the courts of equity came to her
aid. If the contract was made through the intervention of a trustee,
the unity argument failed. In other words, the husband's covenant
ran to the trustee for the wife's use and benefit thus circuiting the
inflexible rule of the common law.'
This necessity of the intervention of a trustee continued for
almost the whole of the 19th century, and it was only with the ad-
vent of the so-called "enabling" statutes that it was discontinued.
But today it is the rule in most jurisdictions that the husband and
wife may deal with each other as they see fit, regarding their real
and personal property, and such agreements are only subject to
1
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS (1937) 22.
"3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 65.
' Sims v Rickets, 35 Ind. 181, 9 Am. Rep. 679 (1871) Aitchison
v. Chamberlain, 243 Mass. 16, 136 N.E. 818 (1922).
'However, in McGregor v. McGregor, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 529
(1888), which involved an agreement entered into between husband
and wife without intervention of a trustee, the court upheld the
agreement, saying that its validity was not based on statute but upon
the common law.
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the rules applied to other contracts made between persons occupy-
ing fiduciary relations.5
To see that these rules have been observed, contracts between
husband and wife are the subject of close scrutiny by a court of
equity While no exact rule can be given by which the validity or
voidness can be assured, a number of factors enter into the court's
process of inspection. First, there are those elements that apply to
all contracts generally; fraud, misrepresentation and duress. Sec-
ondly, because of the peculiar nature of the contracting parties, the
following assume importance: a full disclosure of all relevant facts,
independent counsel, lack of undue influence or coercion, and
lastly, adequacy of consideration, which is the criterion by which
overreaching, unfairness and unreasonableness are determined.
The presence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, lack of full
disclosure, and undue influence or coercion will cause the contract
to be void. There is dissension in the cases as to the necessity of
independent advice, but the weight of authority probably holds
it an essential element.'
Some cases have stated that inadequacy of consideration, called
variously as overreaching, unfairness and unreasonableness, would
void a contract made between husband and wife.' But this is not
strictly true and it would be better to say, as other courts do, that
inadequacy of consideration only raises a presumption against the
validity of the contract which is rebuttable and may be overcome
by proof of a full disclosure of all that the wife should know for
her benefit concerning the nature and effect of the transaction!
Of course, all too often, the husband is unable to rebut the pre-
sumption with satisfactory evidence, and is defeated, not by the
inadequacy of the consideration, but because he cannot prove that
such inadequacy was induced without misrepresentation, coercion,
etc.
That inadequacy of consideration alone, unaccompamed by
other voiding factors is sufficient for voidness, is doubtful. One
of the most recent cases on this problem is that of In re Nickolay's
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS (1937) 31, 3 VERNIER, AMERI-
CAN FAMILY LAws (1935) sec. 156; See Sanborn v Sanborn, 3 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 39 P 2d 830, 832 (1934).
'Peyton v. Peyton Corporation, -Del.-, 7 A. 2d 737, 123 A. L.
R. 1482 (1939), Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522, 28 Atl. 907 (1894)
But see In re Brimhall's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 30, 143 P 2d 981
(1943).
' Cooper V Cooper, 35 A. 2d 921 (D. C. 1944) Washburn v. Gray
49 Ind. 271, 97 N. E. 190 (1912), Leingruber v. Leimgruber, -Ind.-
86 N.E. 73 (1908), Fidelity Title & Trust Co. of Pittsburg v Gra-
ham, 262 Pa. 273, 105 Atl. 295 (1918).
'In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 123, 204 Pac. 583 (1922), Peyton
v. Peyton Corporation, -Del.- 7 A. 2d 737 (1939).
' Charlson v. Charlson, 50 N. D. 677, 197 N. W 778 (1924), Mann
v. Mann, 135 Okla. 211, 275 Pac. 348 (1929)
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Estate." In it a wife by post-nuptial contract accepted $500 in
settlement of all her rights in her husband's estate, which
amounted to about $60,000 when he died, in return for his agree-
ment to release all his rights in his wife's estate. Upon his death, she
brought this action to set aside the contract, alleging want of con-
sideration, fraud and that it was violative of public policy In af-
firming the judgment of the trial court in sustainng the validity
of the contract, the appellate court found that the record disclosed
no duress, coercion or overt acts establishing fraud. On the sub-
ject of the adequacy of consideration this was said, "Anything of
value agreed upon by the parties, where there is no fraud is a
sufficient consideration. Both parties to this contract' regarded
the consideration for the contract adequate and this is a matter for
the parties to judge for themselves.""
In a recent California case, In re Brimhal's Estate, in a con-
tract of property settlement the wife accepted an automobile as her
share of the property being divided, the husband taking the real
property and home furnishings. Said the court, "If there is a finding
supported by substantial evidence that a just and fair disclosure of
all that the wife should know for her benefit concerning the nature
of the transaction has been made to her, such finding dispels the
presumption of undue influence which arises when the husband
gains an advantage in a transaction with his wife."'
In an older case, In -re Slagles Estate"' by post-nuptial contract
the wife agreed in consideration of $4,000 to release in full all right
against the husband's estate which aggregated some $50,000. The
court supported the contract, saying that though the provision for the
wife was in great disproportion to the means of the husband, those
claiming the husband's estate had sufficiently rebutted the presump-
tion of invalidity by evidence which showed the wife entered into it
without coercion and with full knowledge of the value of the hus-
band's estate and of her rights and was hence precluded from re-
pudiating the agreement.
In conclusion it is stated that fairness as evidenced by adequacy
of consideration is not a prerequisite to the validity of the contract.
Its absence is only presumptive evidelce of invalidity which is re-
buttable by sufficient proof to the contrary; and though the rule as to
confidential relations will impose some limitations as to freedom and
liberty of contract, it is still possible that if intended by the parties,
the terms of the contract can be as they please, restricted only by the
laws that govern contracts generally
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"-Wis.- 25 N. W 2d 451 (1946).
'-Wis.-, -, 25 N. W 2d 451, 453 (1946).
62 Cal. App. 2d 30, 143 P 2d 981 (1943).
"62 Cal. App. 2d 30, -, 143 P 981, 983 (1943).
"294 Pa. 442, 144 Atl. 426 (1928)
